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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GALEN L. JONAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880411-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Anne § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989) whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against 
Mr. Jonas for two counts of Theft by Receiving, a third degree 
felony, and one count of Theft by Receiving, a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Was there sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Jonas was 
guilty of Theft by Receiving? 
Was the failure to recuse Judge Banks reversible error? 
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying 
Mr. Jonas' challenge of a juror for cause? 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
Mr, Jonas1 motion for mistrial after the bailiff improperly informed 
the jurors on the last day of trial that another juror had been 
excused and the reason for that excuse? 
Should Mr. Jonas be given a new trial based on the 
violation of his statutory and constitutional rights where an 
inadequate transcript of proceedings was prepared? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Theft by Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Anne § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and § 76-6-412(b) (1978); Theft by 
Receiving, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408 (Supp, 1989) and § 76-6-412(c) (1978); and Theft by 
Receiving, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) and § 76-6-412(b) (1978). A jury found 
Mr. Jonas guilty of the three counts after a trial held on April 20, 
21, 22, and 25, 1988, (R.P. 159-62) in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Jonas was released from prison into a federal halfway 
house in December, 1984 (Transcript of testimony of Barry Brown and 
Galen Jonas, dated April 22, 1988, hereinafter "S.T.," 35-36, 60; 
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Trial Transcript, hereinafter "T.," 268).! He remained there until 
the end of June, 1985 (T. 268; S.T. 60). While Mr. Jonas was still 
in the halfway house, Jim Prater, a police informant, contacted 
Mr. Jonas and offered to sell him drugs (T. 270; S.T. 38-40, 66). 
This angered Mr. Jonas because although he had been involved in 
criminal activities when he was younger, he had changed his 
lifestyle and was trying to resume his life with his wife and 
children (T. 270; S.T. 38). 
Mr. Prater approached Mr. Jonas with another proposition 
in early July, 1985, immediately upon Mr. Jonas1 release from the 
halfway house (S.T. 40). He told Mr. Jonas that he, Mr. Prater, was 
in trouble with the law and that he would do what he had to do to 
get out of trouble (S.T. 41). Mr. Prater had already told a police 
undercover agent, Sgt. Illsley, about Mr. Jonas and agreed to set up 
some contact between Sgt. Illsley and Mr. Jonas (T. 161). In 
exchange for police contact with Mr. Jonas, the County Attorney's 
1 Not all of the transcripts requested in this case were 
initially prepared. In addition, a hearing on Appellant's Motion to 
Amend and Correct Record was held on July 6, 1989. The following 
transcripts exist in this case and hereinafter will be referred to 
as follows: 
Three volumes of trial transcript, 
April 19-22, 1988, numbered 1-309 "T." 
Supplemental Transcript of testimony 
of Barry Brown and Galen Jonas, 
April 22, 1988, numbered 1-73 "S.T." 
Transcript of jury selection/voir 
dire, April 20, 1988 "J.T." 
Transcript of April 25, 1988 prepared 
by reporter who was not present "T.R." 
Transcript of Motion to Amend and 
Correct Record, July 6, 1989 "T.M." 
_ t 
office dismissed charges against Mr. Prater and paid Mr. Prater cash 
(T. 161). 
Mr. Jonas decided to play along with the setup for two 
reasons (S6T9 66). First, he felt that it was impossible to avoid 
entanglement with the police once he had become their target (Id. ) . 
He spent a lot of time trying to avoid contact with Sgt. Illsley but 
was unable to do so because of the persistence of the police 
(S.T. 67). For example, prior to one of the July transactions, 
Sgt. Illsley contacted him by phone four or five times (S.T. 52). 
Second, Mr. Jonas believed that he was not doing anything 
wrong (S.T. 67). He knew that Mr. Prater was an informant and 
communicated this knowledge to two undercover officers (T. 114, 145; 
S.To 58, 66). Mr. Jonas knew the people offering him property were 
police officers and recognized Sgt. Illsley as an officer who had 
previously arrested him (S.T. 42, 61). Mr. Jonas communicated this 
knowledge to a friend, Officer Barry Brown (S.T. 7). Mr. Jonas also 
knew that none of the property was stolen since Mr. Prater had told 
him that the property the officers sold him would be either recently 
purchased by the police or taken from evidence (S.T. 43, 58). 
On July 17, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a television set 
and a VCR from Sgt. Illsley (T. 77, 82-83). Sgt. Roberts had 
purchased both items for use in the sting operation (T. 23-24). 
On July 25, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a television set 
from Sgt. Illsley (T. 85, 93). In 1983, Detective Jim Crowley had 
purchased the television set for use in another sting operation and 
Sgt. Illsley took it from the West Valley City Police evidence room 
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for use in the operation in the present case (T. 237-38). 
On July 30, 1985, Mr. Jonas purchased a VCR and a video 
camera from Sgt. Illsley (T. 95-96). Sgt. Roberts had purchased the 
VCR and camera for use in the transaction (T. 28-29). 
Shortly after these events, sometime in the fall of 1985, 
Mr. Jonas contacted his friend, police officer Barry Brown 
(S.T. 55). He showed Officer Brown the property he had purchased, 
which was still piled in his garage and asked the officer to check 
through NCIC to see if any of the property was stolen (S.T. 11-21, 
27, 56). The NCIC check showed that the property was not stolen 
(S.T. 12). 
In May or June of 1986, Mr. Jonas also had Officer Brown 
accompany him to a meeting where Sgt. Illsley, acting in his 
undercover capacity, was going to sell Mr. Jonas some drugs. The 
deal never happened, but Officer Brown saw someone resembling 
Sgt. Illsley driving away from the meeting place (S.T. 12-13). If 
Sgt. Illsley had tried to sell drugs to Mr. Jonas, Officer Brown was 
to arrest Sgt. Illsley (Id.) 
After the July, 1985 transactions, the police did not 
contact Mr. Jonas again until March, 1986 (T. 99). Mr. Jonas was 
charged with four additional counts of Theft by Receiving for 
similar transactions during March, April and May of 1986. (See 
Information, R. 26-27.) The jury acquitted Mr. Jonas of these 
charges. 
After arresting Mr. Jonas, the officers made no attempt 
to search Mr. Jonas1 house or garage for any of the property 
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(T. 51, 71, 159) * Mr. Jonas had used his own money in purchasing 
the property and had not involved anyone else (S.T. 59). He did not 
sell the property to a fence (S.T. 46); instead, he took the 
property home and left the bulk of it untouched in boxes in his 
garage (Id.) . 
On April 19, 1988, Mr. Jonas made a motion to recuse 
Judge Banks, who had been assigned to the case in place of Judge 
Frederick on the first day of trial (T. 1). In 1964, Judge Banks 
had been the District Attorney and had taken part in a hearing, the 
outcome of which resulted in a dismissal of charges against 
Mr. Jonas (T. 3). Mr. Jonas recalled that District Attorney Banks 
was angry enough over the dismissal to attempt to suspend a police 
officer, whose promise to Mr. Jonas had resulted in the dismissal of 
charges (^ d. ) . Judge Banks had also signed several other 
Informations against Mr. Jonas during his tenure as District 
Attorney (T. 4). The motion to recuse was denied (T. 14). 
During voir dire, several jurors indicated they had been 
victims of theft-related crimes. Juror Number 6, Donna Smith, 
indicated that she and her husband had been the victims of a theft 
in which approximately thirteen thousand dollars worth of tools had 
been stolen (J.T. 22). The theft occurred approximately a year and 
a half prior to the proceedings in the instant case, and Juror Smith 
indicated that the experience might interfere with her ability to be 
fair (J.T. 22-3). The trial judge attempted to rehabilitate her and 
refused to remove her for cause (J.T. 22-23, 44, 48; T. 186-87). 
Defense counsel was forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove 
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her from the panel (R. 163), 
The last day of trial was Monday, April 25, 1988. Over 
the weekend during which the trial was in recess, a pregnant woman 
had been shot and killed during a highly publicized robbery of a 
video store. Juror Davis was the brother of that woman and was 
excused by the court at the juror's request (T.R. 26). 
The bailiff, without authorization and outside the 
presence of Mr* Jonas, his counsel or the court, informed the 
remaining jurors that the court had excused Mr. Davis and told those 
jurors the reason the court excused Mr. Davis (T.R. 5). 
The specific details of the information the bailiff 
conveyed to the jurors is not clear from the record. See T.R. 1-6. 
The court did not question the jurors to determine whether they had 
been tainted. Id. Furthermore, the reporter who was present did 
not prepare a transcript despite Appellant's repeated written and 
oral requests, and another reporter, working from the notes of the 
reporter who was present, attempted to prepare a transcript of the 
proceedings held on April 25, 1988. See generally T.R.; see also 
T.M. 1-18. Portions of that transcript are illegible.2 
Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted 
Mr. Jonas of three counts of Theft by Receiving based on the 
transactions which occurred in July, 1985 (R. 205, 209, 212). The 
jury acquitted Mr. Jonas of the other four counts which were based 
on transactions which occurred during March, April and May of 1986 
(R. 217, 219, 223, 227). 
2 The trial court held a hearing on July 6, 1989 in an 
attempt to reconstruct the record. See discussion infra at p.30. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
If a person knows or reasonably believes that the 
property received pursuant to a Theft by Receiving charge is not 
stolen, that person cannot be guilty of Theft by Receiving, since 
neither a culpable mental state nor a prohibited act has occurred. 
In the present case, there was insufficient evidence to establish 
that Mr. Jonas had the requisite mental state. 
Judge Banks committed prejudicial error when he refused 
to recuse himself upon motion of Mr. Jonas. Judge Banks had been a 
prosecuting attorney involved in a case with Mr. Jonas twenty years 
earlier, and Mr. Jonas recalled that then prosecutor Banks had been 
upset over the outcome. 
The trial judge abused his discretion in failing to 
excuse Juror Smith for cause after she indicated that she had been a 
victim of a crime similar to the crime charged and that she believed 
such experience would interfere with her ability to be impartial. 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for 
mistrial after the bailiff had unauthorized and improper contact 
with the jurors. By informing the remaining jurors that the trial 
court had excused another juror and the reason for that excuse, the 
bailiff interfered with Mr. Jonas' right to a trial by an impartial 
jury. 
The failure of the court reporter to provide an accurate 
transcript of proceedings held on April 25, 1988 violated Mr. Jonas' 
rights to appeal, due process and equal protection under the Utah 
Constitution along with his statutory rights to appeal. The 
- 8 -
preparation of an inadequate and inaccurate transcript also violated 
his federal right to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
THAT MR. JONAS IS GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
A. IF A PERSON KNOWS OR REASONABLY BELIEVES THE 
PROPERTY RECEIVED IS NOT STOLEN, THAT PERSON 
CANNOT BE GUILTY OF THEFT BY RECEIVING. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 1989) reads in part that 
[a] person commits theft if he receives, retains, 
or disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it 
probably has been stolen. 
While the statute does not require the State to prove the property 
received was actually stolen, it does require the State to prove 
that the actor believed the property to be stolen. State v. Pappas, 
705 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 1985). 
The Pappas court explained this as resulting from modern 
criminal jurisprudence's 
very clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent 
instead of simply punishing the manifest 
criminality or outwardly criminal act. 
Id. 
In the theft by receiving statute the Legislature 
expressed its desire to prohibit subjective 
criminality (the culpable mental state of desiring 
to receive stolen property) when it is accompanied 
by an otherwise harmless act (receiving property 
that is not actually stolen). 
In this case, "an otherwise harmless act (receiving 
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property that is not actually stolen)," Xcl., is accompanied by the 
nonculpable mental state of knowing that the property is not 
actually stolen. If there is "a legislative desire not to punish 
manifestly criminal acts that are not accompanied by a subjective 
mental state to do wrong," _Id. at 1172 (emphasis in the original), 
there certainly can be no legislative desire to punish noncriminal 
acts accompanied by a nonculpable mental state. 
B. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT 
MR. JONAS BELIEVED THE PROPERTY TO BE STOLEN. 
wIt is fundamental that the State carries the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense." 
State v. Hilly 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). 
In applying this rule, . . . we have held that 
where the only proof of material fact or one which 
is a necessary element of defendant's guilt 
consists of circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must reasonably preclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of defendant's innocence. 
State v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57, 59-60 (Utah 1960). This is because 
the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily 
raises a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Hill, 727 P.2d 
at 222. 
Mr. Jonas was convicted on three counts of Theft by 
Receiving: 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) the defendant received, retained, or disposed 
of the property of another, (2) knowing that the 
property had been stolen or believing that it 
probably had been stolen, (3) with the purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. 
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Hill, 727 P.2d at 223, citing Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-408 (Supp. 
1989). Mr. Jonas' defense to the charges is that he knew that the 
property was not stolen. 
Mr. Jonas testified that in July, 1985, he talked to 
Mr. Prater, who told Mr. Jonas about the sting operation, the 
targeting of Mr. Jonas, and the undercover identity of Sgt. Illsley 
(S.T. 41). Mr. Prater was absent from the jurisdiction at the time 
of trial and therefore could neither refute nor corroborate this 
evidence (T. 148-49). The prosecution witnesses admitted that they 
had no idea what Mr. Prater had told Mr. Jonas of their meetings 
(To 68-70, 163-64). However, Mr. Jonas1 wife, Annette Jonas, 
testified that in July, 1985, she was part of a conversation between 
herself, Prater and the defendant during which Prater told Mr. Jonas 
about the "sting" operation but told him "not to worry about it, 
that the merchandise was not stolen" (T. 277). Annette Jonas also 
testified that her husband told her that he recognized Sgt. Illsley 
as an officer who had arrested him in 1982 (T. 272).3 
Mr. Jonas1 reaction to this information from Mr. Prater 
was to feel angry and uneasy (S.T. 41). He felt that it was unfair 
for the police to hound him, and he was worried that they would 
continue to harrass him. His plan was to participate in the 
operation, and somewhere along the line, find an opportunity to trip 
up the police (Id.). 
3
 Sgt. Illsley testified that he had participated in the 
arrest of Mr. Jonas in 1982. 
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Officer Barry Brown testified that three times in June of 
1986, Mr. Jonas asked him to check the serial numbers of the 
property with the NCIC computer (S.T. 11). None of the property was 
stolen, according to NCIC, and Officer Brown communicated this 
information to Mr. Jonas (S.T. 12). After Mr. Jonas was arrested, 
Officer Brown also talked to his superior, Lt. Vuyk, about Mr. Jonas 
(S.T. 22). Additionally, sometime in May or June of 1986, Officer 
Brown accompanied Mr. Jonas to a location where Sgt. Illsley was to 
sell Mr. Jonas illegal drugs. The purpose of Officer Brown's 
presence was to arrest Sgt. Illsley. The officer saw someone who 
looked like Sgt. Illsley drive by, but that person did not stop to 
pursue the transaction (S.T. 12-13, 70-72). 
Mr. Jonas further testified that he knew the property he 
purchased was either recently purchased or old evidence (S.T. 43, 
58). The State made no attempt to ascertain the final destination 
of any of the property (T. 51, 71, 159); however, Mr. Jonas 
testified that he never delivered any of the property to a fence 
(S.T. 46). All of the property except one item remained in 
Mr. Jonas' garage (S.T. 46). Although the police made no attempt to 
search Mr. Jonas' house to locate any of the property (T. 51, 71, 
159), Officer Brown testified that he saw a pile of boxed items in 
Mr. Jonas' garage just before Mr. Jonas was arrested (S.T. 27). 
The only evidence offered by the prosecution to establish 
that Mr. Jonas believed the property was stolen came from 
Sgt. Illsley, whose testimony was that he told Mr. Jonas the 
property was stolen. However, Mr. Jonas' testimony as corroborated 
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by his wife and Officer Brown "negate[s] the required second element 
of knowledge" or belief that the property was stolen. Hilly 727 
P.2d at 223. "The state, therefore, had the burden of disproving 
this explanation beyond a reasonable doubt* (Ijd.) . As in Hill, 
there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Mr. Jonas believed the property to be stolen. 
In Hill, the Defendant's conviction for Theft by 
Receiving was based on testimony that he had been in a burglarized 
store the day before the burglary and was found in possession of 
several of the missing items several days after the burglary. 
Hill's defense was that he did not know the items were stolen but 
rather had bought them from another person who, as it later turned 
out, had actually committed the burglary. The Court held that even 
though there was suspicious evidence pointing to knowledge that the 
goods were stolen, the evidence was insufficient to prove knowledge 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In State v. George, 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971), the Utah 
Supreme Court indicated that where the "possibility or even 
probability" that a reasonable alternative hypothesis is true (Id. 
at 667), it is "more conscionable if a guilty one might on occasion, 
where proof is lacking, go free rather than gamble with the lives of 
those who might be guiltless" (^ d. at 668). In the present case, it 
is more than possible, it is probable that Mr. Jonas knew the 
property was not stolen; proof otherwise is lacking. Therefore, his 
convictions for Theft by Receiving should be reversed. 
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POINT II. THE FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE BANKS 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29 (c) and (d) (Supp. 1989) set 
forth the applicable procedure for challenging the ability of a 
trial judge to hear a particular case. Those subsections provide: 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in any 
criminal action or proceeding files an affidavit 
that the judge before whom the action or proceeding 
is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, 
either against the party or his attorney or in 
favor of any opposing party to the suit, the judge 
shall proceed no further until the challenge is 
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the facts 
and the reasons for the belief that the bias or 
prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon as 
practicable after the case has been assigned or the 
bias or prejudice is known. No affidavit may be 
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of 
counsel of record that the affidavit and 
application are made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualification, 
he shall enter an order directing that a copy be 
forthwith certified to another named judge of the 
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged 
judge does not question the legal sufficiency of 
the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is legally 
sufficient, another judge shall be called to try 
the case or to conduct the proceeding. If the 
judge to whom the affidavit is certified does not 
find the affidavit to be legally sufficient, he 
shall enter a finding to that effect and the 
challenged judge shall proceed with the case or 
proceeding. 
In the present case, the judge who heard the case replaced 
the previously assigned judge on the day of trial (T. 8, 116). 
Immediately upon hearing of the change in judges, Mr. Jonas filed an 
Affidavit of Prejudice (R. 122-125). At a hearing held prior to the 
commencement of the trial, Mr. Jonas testified that in 1964, Judge 
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Banks had prosecuted a case against Mr. Jonas in which the State had 
been forced to dismiss the charges based on a promise made by an 
officer (T. 2-3). Then District Attorney Banks was irritated by the 
resolution of the case and had wanted the officer suspended for his 
actions (T. 3). Mr. Jonas also testified that then District 
Attorney Banks had also prosecuted him on other matters (T. 3-4, 
6-7, 8). Two of the convictions obtained while Judge Banks was 
District Attorney formed the basis of the Habitual Criminal charge 
(T. 9). 
Judge Banks denied having any actual prejudice against 
Mr. Jonas and found that sufficient legal grounds for disqualifying 
himself did not exist (T. 14, R. 156). He referred the affidavit to 
Judge Sawaya, who denied the motion and referred the case back to 
Judge Banks for trial (T. 158). 
In State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988), the 
defendants filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Banks based on the 
fact that twenty years earlier, in his role as District Attorney, 
Judge Banks filed four Informations against one of the defendants 
and appeared in court to accept a guilty plea from that same 
defendant. JLd. at 103. The Utah Supreme Court held that reversible 
error had not occurred since the defendant had not established 
actual bias or an abuse of discretion and the court had complied 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29. L3. at 1094-5. 
In reaching its decision, the Neeley Court pointed out, 
however, that "a judge should recuse himself when his 'impartiality1 
might reasonably be questioned. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
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3(C)(1)(b) (1981)." id. at 1094. While pointing out that 
noncompliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct does not necessarily 
mandate a new trial for a defendant, the Neeley Court also affirmed 
thatt 
In holding that the failure to recuse is not 
reversible error in this case, we do not withdraw 
from the stand this Court has taken on previous 
occasions that the integrity of the judicial system 
should be protected against any taint of suspicion 
[citation omitted]. 
JTd. 
Although the facts of the instant case are similar to 
those in Neeley, there are significant differences which establish 
that, despite Judge Banks1 denial of actual prejudice, he abused his 
discretion in not removing himself from the case. 
As District Attorney, Judge Banks was more intimately 
involved in a specific case against Mr. Jonas than he had been in 
the charges against Mr. Belt which are discussed in Neeley. He did 
more than merely file Informations and accept a guilty plea from 
Mr. Jonas. He was forced to dismiss charges based on a promise made 
by a police officer and, as a result, became angry enough to want to 
suspend the officer. Hence, he was more involved in decision making 
in Mr. Jonas1 case and had negative reactions to the outcome. In 
addition, he was involved in the prosecution of several other cases 
against Mr. Jonas (T. 3). The appearance of prejudice in this case 
required that a different judge hear it. Due to the extent of his 
involvement in the earlier case and his anger at the resolution, 
Judge Banks should not have heard this case and committed reversible 
error by not recusing himself. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN DENYING MR. JONAS8 CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE, 
Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
in pertinent part: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him 
from acting impartially and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter 
or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded 
upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused 
in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 
In an effort to comply with this mandatory provision, the 
legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1982). See State v. 
Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981); State v, Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 
(Utah 1977). The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule as Rule 18, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees an accused a fair trial by an impartial jury 
and held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
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excuse for cause two jurors who had been victims of a burglary. The 
Court stated: 
Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong 
emotional response, there is posed a warning that 
the juror may not have a mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference to the party or cause 
before the court . . . [B]ased on the juror's 
expressed feelings, attitudes, and opinions, the 
trial court must determine by a process of logic 
and reason, based upon common experience, whether 
the juror can stand in attitude of indifference 
between the state and the accused. 
Id. at 884. In Brooks, the defendant was charged with Burglary and 
the two potential jurors had been burglarized in the past and felt 
bitter about their experiences. Both stated that they could be fair 
and impartial only after the judge questioned them several times on 
the matter. Their initial response to the questioning was that they 
might not be able to be impartial. The judge refused to remove the 
two jurors for cause, and defense counsel was forced to use two 
peremptory challenges. 
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in failing to remove the jurors for cause and reversed 
the case. As the Court stated in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 
(Utah 1987); citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884: "When a prospective 
juror expresses an attitude of bias, a later assertion by the juror 
that he or she can render an impartial verdict cannot attenuate the 
earlier expressions of bias." Furthermore, the court pointed out in 
Brooks that "the failure to excuse a juror for cause and thus to 
compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the 
juror was prejudicial (citations omitted)." Brooks, 631 P.2d at 883. 
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Under Brooksf once a prospective juror expresses a bias 
regarding the casef the trial court must evaluate that bias in an 
objective fashion and not merely seek to rehabilitate the juror so 
as to get the juror to state that he can be impartial. If the court 
fails to probe into the matter sufficiently and relies on conclusory 
statements of the prospective juror, there has been an abuse of 
discretion creating prejudicial error. State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 
765, 768 (Utah 1980). In addition, if the court's inquiry does not 
even go this far, but only elicits general and indefinite responses, 
an abuse of discretion has also occurred. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 
22, 26-27 (Utah 1984); see also, State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473 (Utah 
1987)* 
When the judge initially asked whether any of the 
potential jurors had been a victim of a theft, he intimated that he 
did not approve of the question by prefacing it with the statement, 
"I almost hate to ask this question, but I'm obligated to" 
(J.T. 22). Juror Smith was the first juror to respond, and the 
trial judge interrrupted her two attempts to explain the incident 
and her feelings about it. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my husband had 
about $13,000 worth of tools stolen about a year 
and a half ago which we have never — 
THE COURT: Did a criminal act result from that — 
or action? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was reported to 
the police, which they didn't do anything about, 
and we still have never gotten — 
THE COURT: They didnft find it? 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: (shook head from side 
to side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: About a year and a 
half ago. 
J.T. 22. The judge then asked Ms. Smith whether the experience 
would interfere with her ability to sit as a juror, and she 
responded that it might. 
THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind, as I 
indicated, there are different parties involved, 
but sometimes based on our experience we allow that 
to interfere with our thinking. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It might be. If it 
was tools, I might be a little influenced. 
T. 22-3. The Court cut her off and stated: 
Well, wait just a minute. Let me ask the questions 
and you just answer the question. 
Although the trial judge's tone is not ascertainable from the 
record, the questions and statements themselves suggest that the 
judge was irritated by the juror's response that she might be 
influenced. Given the awe and intimidation most people feel when 
addressed by a judge, that irritation, coupled with the judge's 
prior suggestion that he disapproved of the question, would make it 
difficult for most potential jurors to be open and admit their 
bias. Nevertheless, when the trial judge attempted to rehabilitate 
Juror Smith, she indicated that the experience would influence her 
ability to serve as a juror. 
THE COURT: Bearing in mind, do you believe that 
that incident would make it difficult for you to be 
fair and impartial, particularly to this Defendant, 
as well as the people of the state of Utah? 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It's a little hard to 
say. 
THE COURT: Well, you just take time to think it 
over because we — you're the one that — 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It probably would, yes. 
J.T. 23. The trial judge again attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Smith. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs. — 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe that you could set 
those facts aside and make a determination on the 
evidence that's presented in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I — well, yes, I 
believe I could be impartial. 
J.T. 23. At this point, the judge acknowledged that "[w]e know you 
didn't like to lose the tools" (J.T. 23); Ms. Smith agreed, "No, I 
didn't" (S.T. 23). 
After the above exchange, the Court moved on to the next 
juror and did not further question Juror Smith regarding the theft 
or any bias or prejudice she might feel as a result of it. See 
Addendum A for entire transcript of court's questioning of 
prospective juror Smith. 
Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause at the 
bench and later placed his exception to the Court's failure to 
excuse her on the record (J.T. 44, 48; T. 186-7). 
The present case is similar to Brooks in that the juror 
was a victim of a crime similar to the one charged. The juror 
indicated that as a result, it might be difficult to be fair and 
impartial. After repeated indications by the juror that she had 
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concerns about her impartiality, the Court asked a single leading 
question, to which the juror responded that she believed she could 
be impartial. After acknowledging that the juror did not like being 
the victim of a theft, the Court dropped the subject and refused to 
excuse her. 
The exchange as a whole indicates that Juror Smith did not 
believe she could be impartial. The single response that she could 
be impartial did not rehabilitate her as a juror and the trial judge 
abused his discretion in failing to exclude her or to question her 
further regarding her bias. Under such circumstances, Mr, Jonas was 
denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury under the 
federal and state constitutions as well as his statutory right to 
excuse jurors for cause. Defense counsel was required to use a 
peremptory challenge to remove Juror Smith from the panel and, as a 
result, the matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial 
(Re 163). 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT MR. JONAS' MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
On the last day of trial, Monday, April 25, 1988, juror 
Davis informed the court that he could not continue as a juror due 
to the fact that his pregnant sister had been murdered in a robbery 
of a video store over the weekend (T.R. 2-3).4 Prior to court being 
called into session, the bailiff approached the remaining jurors and 
4 The video store robbery and homicide had been highly 
publicized during the two days prior to the last day of trial. 
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told them "that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his sister was the 
lady that was shot out in West Valley* (T.R. 5). 
Although the record of the last day of trial has not been 
completely transcribed and a dispute exists between Appellant and 
prosecuting attorney as to the specifics of what the bailiff said to 
the jury, the trial judge, based on his memory, indicated that he 
recalled that the bailiff told the jurors that Mr. Davis1 sister had 
been murdered in the video store robbery and that Mr. Davis could no 
longer serve because he could not concentrate due to the trauma of 
that event (T.M. 3-4). The jurors had not been aware of Mr. Davis1 
relationship to the victim in that highly publicized event prior to 
the statement, nor were they discussing the case or the incident 
when the bailiff spoke to them. According to the bailiff, "[t]hey 
didn't know anything about it" prior to his comments (T.R. 5). 
Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and 
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee a 
criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial jury. In 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
"reaffirm[ed] the proposition that a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial 
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which 
goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended and brief contact." Id. 
at 280; citing State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943); Glazier v. 
Cram, 267 P. 188 (Utah 1928); and State v. Anderson, 237 P. 941 
(Utah 1925). The Pike Court noted: 
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We have long taken a strict approach in assuring 
that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial 
not be compromised by improper contacts between 
jurors and witnesses, attorneys or court personnel. 
712 P.2d at 279. The Pike Court held that such improper contact 
raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, requiring the State to 
establish that the improper contact did not influence the jury* 
The possibility that improper contacts may 
influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be 
able to recognize and that a defendant may be left 
with questions as to the impartiality of the jury, 
leads to the conclusion that where the contact is 
more than incidental, the burden is on the 
prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact 
did not influence the juror. 
Idc In Pike, a State witness and juror discussed the witness1 limp 
which had been caused when the witness "bunged* his toe. Pike, 712 
P*2d at 279. That conversation was more than brief or incidental 
and raised a presumption of prejudice which was not rebutted. 
Although Pike involved improper contact between a 
prosecution witness and juror rather than court personnel and a 
juror, the language employed in the case and the reasoning is just 
as applicable where there is a possibility that a juror or jurors 
have been tainted by the unauthorized statements or actions of court 
personnel. In Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court acknowledged that: 
. . . the official character of the bailiff—as an 
officer of the court as well as the State—beyond 
question carries great weight with the jury . . . 
385 U.S. at 365. 
In State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
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Supreme Court followed the approach set out in Pike, Although 
Erickson also involved contact between a prosecution witness and a 
juror, the Court again encompassed unauthorized contact between a 
juror and court personnel in its holding "that prejudice will be 
presumed from any contact between witnesses, attorneys or court 
personnel and jurors that goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended 
contact." Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621 (emphasis added). In Erickson, 
a juror and a State witness had a four or five-minute conversation 
during which the two discussed their families and the witness' job. 
The Court determined that "[t]he conversation was more than a brief, 
incidental contact where only remarks of civilty were exchanged!]" 
(Id,) and that the presumption of prejudice raised by the conduct 
had not been rebutted. 
In Prudencio v. Gonzales, 727 P.2d 553 (New Mexico App. 
1986), the Court pointed out that a "bailiff's duty is to attend the 
court and jury" and that "[w]hen the bounds of that duty are 
exceeded through the bailiff's conduct or comments, the question 
arises as to whether the jury process has been irreparably harmed or 
prejudiced [citations omitted]." 727 P.2d at 554. 
By virtue of being a court official who has close 
contact with the jury, a bailiff must guard his 
comments and actions while in their presence. When 
the bailiff's conduct invades or infringes upon the 
jury's province, it is probable that prejudice will 
occur [citation omitted]. 
In the present case, the exact nature of the bailiff's 
comments to the jury regarding the release of Juror Davis is not 
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clear both because of the illegible portions of the transcript, 
which was prepared by a reporter who was not present during the 
proceedings (see discussion infra at p.30), as well as the limited 
discussion by only the bailiff as to what occurred. The bailiff 
stated: 
I went in and I told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't 
be in because his sister was the lady that was shot 
out in West Valley. 
(T.R. 5). The trial court did not question the jurors as to the 
details of what the bailiff had told them or to ascertain whether 
their impartiality had been affected by the bailiff's unauthorized 
comments. 
In Scott v. State, 448 P.2d 272 (Okl. Cr. 1968), the Court 
noted that "from the record in this case, it is not made entirely 
clear whether or not anything else was said between the bailiff and 
the jury, other than with reference to coffee. Such being the case, 
the prejudice is presumed, and as I review the record that 
presumption was not overcome." I^d. at 275. 
Similarly, in Pike, where the questioning of a witness was 
brief and did not disclose the entire contents of the conversation 
and there was "no other evidence as to the scope and subject matter 
of the conversation since a transcript of the post-verdict 
questioning of the juror has not been provided on . . . appeal," 712 
P.2d at 280, the Court determined that from what was reported, a 
presumption of prejudice had been raised which was not rebutted. 
Hence, any uncertainty in the record as to the exact nature of the 
statements made by the bailiff must work in favor of Mr. Jonas. 
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Although there is disagreement as to the specifics of what 
the bailiff said to the jurors in this case (see Affidavit of Galen 
Jonas, Addendum F and Order Settling Record, Addendum G), the 
information which is included in the transcript establishes that the 
contact between the bailiff and the jurors was more than brief and 
incidental and went beyond mere civilties. At the very least, the 
bailiff informed the jurors of the reason that another juror had 
been excused. He made them aware that the juror's sister had been 
murdered in a highly publicized incident that had occurred over the 
weekend. 
The bailiff's action in informing the jurors of a reason 
for excusing another juror was outside his role as a bailiff and 
went beyond any permissible contact that might be allowed as part of 
his duties in shepherding the jury. The statement tended to 
heighten the jurors' awareness of crime in the community and would 
give rise to all of the reactions, fears and concerns that people 
feel when considering society's current level of criminal activity. 
The nature of the information was far more intense and of a more 
prejudicial nature to a criminal defendant than a conversation about 
a bunged toe or a witness' job. In addition, any follow-up 
commentary by the jurors or the bailiff concerning the specific 
incident or crime in general, none of which was recorded but which 
it is reasonable to assume occurred, could have a significant 
prejudicial impact on a criminal defendant whose case was currently 
being tried. 
Information to the jurors regarding the reason for 
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excusing Mr. Davis should have been carefully controlled. Instead, 
the bailiff imparted the information in a completely uncontrolled 
situation where Mr. Jonas and his attorney had no opportunity to 
hear what was said and no opportunity to have input or comment on 
the information or to object to it being conveyed. 
Because the bailiff is viewed by the jury as an extension 
of the court and because his position is that of a court official, 
his statements carry great weight. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 
at 365. Furthermore, he has a responsibility to monitor and control 
his actions and statements while in the presence of the jury so as 
to not taint them. Since the bailiff's contact with the jury as a 
whole went beyond one of a brief and incidental nature, a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice was raised by his unauthorized comments. 
The State did not rebut the presumption of prejudice in 
this case. When defense counsel initially made his motion for 
mistrial, the prosecutor briefly argued, apparently in an attempt to 
establish a lack of prejudice, that the jurors had already been 
discussing the matter before the bailiff approached them (T.R. 4). 
However, contrary to the prosecutor's argument, the bailiff 
ultimately testified that the jurors had not been discussing the 
matter when he entered the jury room and that they knew nothing 
about it before he informed them (T.R. 5). In the hearing held on 
July 6, 1989, the trial judge made a finding that the bailiff's 
statement that the jurors knew nothing about the excusal of 
Mr. Davis was accurate (T.M. 12 & 14, see Addendum G). Hence, the 
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jurors were unaware of the information before the bailiff entered 
the jury room. 
When defense counsel initially made his motion, the trial 
judge summarily denied it without prejudice (T.R. 3). Thereafter, 
the bailiff briefly testified. The gist of the bailiff's testimony 
was that he had given the information to the jurors and that they 
had not been aware of it prior to his entry. Everything about the 
bailiff's testimony establishes that the jury may have been tainted 
by the information and does nothing to overcome the presumption of 
prejudice raised by the improper contact. Following the bailiff's 
testimony, the court apparently again denied the motion (T.R. 5). 
The State offered no information to rebut the presumption 
of prejudice in this case. As previously pointed out, this is the 
type of information that probably impacted emotionally on the 
jurors. Even without further commentary by the jurors or the 
bailiff, given the highly publicized nature of the video store case, 
it is likely that the jurors reacted emotionally to the information. 
Furthermore, Mr. Jonas' recollection of the incident 
raises an overwhelming concern that the jury was tainted in an 
irreparable manner by the improper communication. As set forth in 
Point V infra, Mr. Jonas' recollection of the information conveyed 
to the jurors went beyond that of the prosecuting attorney and 
judge. He recalled that the jurors were informed that Mr. Davis 
felt he could not be fair because the perpetrator of the video store 
homicide had a lengthy record, as did Mr. Jonas, and it would be 
difficult for him to therefore sit on a criminal trial. (See 
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Addendum F.) While trial counsel could not remember the details of 
what the jury was told, he did recall that he was concerned about 
the manner in which the information was conveyed to the jurors as 
well as the content of the information. If the statement to the 
jury was as Mr. Jonas recalls, or if any of the commentary by the 
bailiff or the jurors included concern about an ability to be fair 
because of the level of criminal activity in the community or the 
level of criminal activity by Mr. Jonas, or any sort of comparison 
between Mr. Jonas and the perpetrator in the video store robbery, 
the prejudicial nature of the bailiff's comments simply could not be 
overcome. 
In this case, where the bailiff conveyed unauthorized 
information to the jurors, and the State failed to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice raised by that contact, the matter should 
be reversed and Mr. Jonas given a new trial. 
POINT V. THE FAILURE OF THE COURT REPORTER TO 
PREPARE AN ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
VIOLATED MR. JONAS' STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
For the purposes of trial, Mr. Jonas retained counsel to 
represent him. Following Mr. Jonas' conviction, trial counsel filed 
a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 254) and Request for Transcript in 
which he requested that a transcript of all of the proceedings in 
the instant case be prepared (R. 252). Trial counsel also obtained 
an Order requiring the State to pay the cost of transcribing the 
proceedings, based on Mr. Jonas' indigent status while incarcerated, 
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and withdrew as counsel upon the appointment of current counsel to 
represent Mr. Jonas (R. 257-265). 
Although reporter Anna Bennett was present for the 
proceedings in this case on all other days of the trial, on 
April 25, 1988, Tauni (Byrd) Lee, another reporter, was present for 
the majority of the proceedings (R. 162). On that day, Appellant 
argued at least one motion for mistrial based on the bailiff's 
unauthorized contact with jurors (see Point IV, supra), the trial 
court instructed the jurors, the parties gave closing arguments, and 
the jury reached its verdict (R. 162). 
Despite Appellant's request, the reporter who was present 
did not transcribe the proceedings for April 25, 1988 (see 
Addendum H). After leaving her job, she apparently left the area. 
Appellate counsel made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to locate her 
and to obtain a transcription of the last day of trial (see Addenda 
B, C, D). 
On February 3, 1989, this Court issued an order giving 
Appellant ten days in which to locate the missing court reporter 
and, if unsuccessful, an additional twenty days in which to 
reconstruct and submit the record (Addendum I). On February 23, 
1989, this Court issued an additional order giving Appellant up to 
April 14, 1989 to locate the reporter or reconstruct the record 
(Addendum J). Based on the February 23 order, on April 14, 1989, 
Appellant filed a Motion to Amend Record with Affidavits attached 
(Addendum K). 
In response to Appellant's motion, the State contacted 
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Anna Bennett, the reporter who had transcribed the proceedings from 
the other days of trial (Addendum L). Ms. Bennett was able to 
locate the notes of the missing reporter from April 25, 1988 and 
attempted to transcribe them* The transcription contains several 
"illegible" sections. See Addendum H.5 
Appellant objected to the content of the transcript and on 
June 2, 1989, filed a Notice with this Court that the transcript was 
not adequate (see Addendum M). On June 12, 1989, Appellant filed a 
filed a Motion to Amend and Correct Record with four affidavits 
attached (Addendum D; see also Affidavits, Addenda C-F). The State 
objected and on July 6, 1989, the trial judge held a hearing to 
settle the record. 
As set forth in Mr. Jonas' affidavit, Mr. Jonas recalled 
that Mrc Davis' inability to serve as a juror stemmed in part from 
the similarity between the criminal past of Mr. Jonas and that of 
the perpetrator in the video store robbery in which his sister had 
been killed over the weekend. Mr. Jonas further recalled that the 
bailiff conveyed this information to the jurors. See Addendum F. 
As set forth in trial counsel's affidavit, trial counsel 
was unable to remember specific details of the case but did recall 
making a motion for mistrial "based on some problem with a juror." 
See Addendum E. His major concern regarding that motion "was the 
means and manner in which the information was conveyed, as well as 
5
 Reporter Bennett incorrectly dated the front of the 
transcript as "April 25, 1989." The proceedings actually occurred 
on April 25, 1988. 
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what [he] conceived of as the prejudicial content.11 Addendum E.6 
Furthermore, trial counsel believed that he may have made an 
additional motion for mistrial based on some error made by the 
prosecutor during his closing argument. 
At the hearing to reconstruct the record, the prosecutor 
took the position that all critical aspects of that day's 
proceedings were included in the transcript which was prepared by 
Anna Bennett (T.M. 11). The trial judge, based on his memory, 
attempted to fill in the illegible portions of the transcript 
(T.M. 3-5, 8, 11, 12-14, 15-16). 
A. THE INADEQUATE TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES MR. JONAS1 
RIGHT TO APPEAL AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution explicitly 
guarantees, inter alia, that a criminal defendant shall have a 
"right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const., Art. I, § 12. See 
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions at v.7 In State v. Tuttle, 
713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that 
this provision establishes that "the drafters of our constitution 
considered the right to appeal essential to a fair criminal 
proceeding." _I<3. at 704. The Court emphasized: 
6 since appellate counsel did not represent Mr. Jonas at 
trial, she had no input on the details of the missing proceedings. 
7 The federal constitution does not explicitly provide for 
a right to appeal criminal convictions. Instead, the constitutional 
right to appeal is part of a criminal defendant's right to due 
process under that constitution. See discussion infra at 41-2. 
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Rights guaranteed by our state constitution are to 
be carefully protected by the courts. We will not 
permit them to be lightly forfeited. 
Id. The Court acknowledged that although federal rights to due 
process and equal protection do not require reinstatement of an 
appeal which was dismissed when the defendant escaped when that same 
defendant is subsequently returned to custody, "the fundamental 
nature of the right to appellate review" under the State 
constitution offers greater protection and does require such 
reinstatement. J^ d. at fn.l. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) codifies this right to 
appeal. In addition, various statutes and constitutional provisions 
facilitate this fundamental right to appellate review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) provides that an 
indigent defendant be appointed counsel through "the taking of a 
first appeal . .
 c"; Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (Supp. 1989) requires 
the governmental agency that prosecuted the defendant pay the costs 
of preparing the transcripts for use on appeal. 
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-1 et seq. (1987) outlines the procedure for the appointment 
of qualified court reporters as well as the duties of such 
reporters. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-2 (1987) requires a court 
reporter to attend all sessions of court and to furnish "with 
reasonable diligence" a transcript of the proceedings to an indigent 
defendant "upon payment of the fees as provided." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-8(1) (Supp. 1989) clarifies that an indigent defendant can 
obtain an order of the court that the prosecuting agency pay the 
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costs of the transcripts in lieu of payment of fees. To ensure that 
court proceedings are transcribed as requested, the legislature has 
mandated that violation of the Act is a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-19 (1987) . 
Very little Utah case law exists which discusses the 
effect of an inadequate or nonexistent transcript in a criminal 
case. In State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979), without stating 
whether its decision was based on state or federal constitutional 
grounds, the Utah Supreme Court held that failure to transcribe 
closing arguments did not deprive a criminal defendant of his 
constitutional right to appeal. In reaching its decision, the Court 
pointed out that arguments are often lengthy and spoken quickly, 
that the trial court has the discretion to not have them recorded 
pursuant to statute, and defense counsel is present and can place 
objections as to any perceived irregularity in the record. 
In State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982) (per curiam), 
the Court followed Gray with very little discussion and, again, 
without clarifying whether the decision was based on state or 
federal grounds. 
Defendant contends that it was error not to have 
required recordation of the argument of the 
prosecutor to the jury. This assertion is without 
substance since defendant and his counsel made no 
request therefor and have pointed to no statements 
claimed to have been prejudicial or beyond the 
accepted scope and latitude accorded the process of 
summation and comment. [Footnote omitted.] 
Furthermore, the question of such transcription is 
ordinarily the prerogative of the trial judge. 
[Footnote omitted.] 
Glenny, 656 P.2d at 992. 
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A year after the decision in Glenny, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed a criminal conviction where the transcript of the 
voir dire of the jury panel contained inaudible responses. In 
State v, Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), faulty recording 
equipment in the circuit court had made it impossible to transcribe 
the missing portions of the record. The Court emphasized in its 
decision that 
When faced with claims that a juror's responses to 
voir dire questions demonstrated actual bias, this 
Court is not at liberty on appeal to assume what 
those answers showed when they are totally absent 
from the record and cannot be reconstructed by 
agreement of the parties. [Footnote omitted.] 
Id. at 44?8. The Court held that "a new trial [was] required 
because of [the Court's] inability to review the appellant's claims 
about the voir dire on an inadequate record . . . ." Ld. at 447. 
In Taylor, the Court again did not clarify whether its decision was 
based on state or federal grounds. 
A number of older decisions from various states have held 
that the defendant's right to appeal has been violated, requiring 
reversal of the conviction, where the court reporter has not 
prepared an adequate transcript. See, e.g., Little v. State, 97 
S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Brannan v. State, 132 S.W.2d 594 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Seliger v. State, 138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1940); People v. Lomoso, 134 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1954); Gibbs v. State, 214 P.745 (Okl. Crim. App. 1923); People v. 
8 in footnote 3, the Taylor Court pointed out that the 
parties had attempted to prepare an "Agreed Statement of Record"; 
they had been unable to fill in the gaps by stipulation. 
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DeWilkowska, 285 N.Y.S. 430 (App. Div. 1936). Although most of 
these cases are not clear as to whether the decision is based on 
state statutory or constitutional grounds, or federal grounds, they 
affirm the principle that where a criminal defendant, through no 
fault of his own, is denied an adequate transcript of the 
proceedings, the conviction must be reversed due to the inability of 
the appellate court to review the proceedings. 
In addition, a number of state courts have reversed 
criminal convictions based on a state constitutional analysis where 
portions of a transcript are missing. In State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 
107 (La. 1976), the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction where the court reporter recorded only a portion of the 
trial. The missing portion included the testimony of four 
witnesses, the voir dire of the jury panel, and the prosecutor's 
opening statement. Appellate counsel did not represent the 
defendant at trial and therefore "had no independent knowledge of 
trial events except as revealed by the incomplete record." JEcL at 
108. Relying on the "absolute right" to appeal a criminal 
conviction under the Louisiana constitution, the Court stated: 
[W]ithout a complete record from which a transcript 
for appeal may be prepared, a defendant's right of 
appellate review is rendered meaningless. 
I_d. at 110. 
In State v. Jones, 351 So.2d 1194 (La, 1977), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court again relied on the state constitution in 
reversing a conviction where a portion of the proceedings had not 
been recorded. In that case, the missing portion was the hearing on 
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a motion for change of venue. See also State v. Robinson, 387 So.2d 
1143 (La. 1980); State v. Thetford, 445 So.2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 
1984). 
In State v. Perry, 401 N.W*2d 748 (Wis. 1987), the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction where 
portions of the transcript from two mornings of an eight-day trial 
were missing based on the absolute right to an appeal under the 
Wisconsin Constitution. I_d. at 751. The Court emphasized that for 
the right to appeal to be meaningful, "a defendant [must] be 
furnished a full transcript—or a functionally equivalent substitute 
that, in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt, portrays in a 
way that is meaningful to the particular appeal exactly what 
happened in the course of trial. See also Commonwealth v. 
Goldsmith, 304 A.2d 478 (Pa. 1973). Although the Perry Court stated 
that "not all deficiencies in the record nor all inaccuracies 
require a new trial11 (^ d. at 752), *[a]ny failure of the appellate 
process which prevents a putative appellant from demonstrating 
possible error constitutes a constitutional deprivation of the right 
to appeal." Id!, at 751. 
The Perry Court, while not advocating a "per se" rule 
where appellate counsel did not represent the defendant at trial, 
focused on the disadvantages and handicaps to defendant and new 
counsel where portions of the transcript are not available and 
counsel was not present at trial. 
New counsel is operating under serious 
handicaps . . . Recollections and notes of trial 
counsel . . .are apt to be faulty and incomplete. 
- 38 -
Frequently, issues simply cannot even be seen—-let 
alone assessed--without reading an accurate 
transcript. 
Id. at 754, quoting B. Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate 
Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 792-3 (1961). 
The distinct language contained in Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution guaranteeing a right to appeal criminal 
convictions, along with the Supreme Court's decision in State v. 
Tuttle giving greater protection under that provision than its 
federal counterpart, establishes that the right to appeal a 
conviction is fundamental to a criminal defendant in Utah. A review 
of Utah statutes directed at implementing this right along with 
decisions from other jurisdictions establish that an accurate 
transcript of proceedings is necessary for a meaningful appeal. See 
generally Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964). 
In the instant case, a complete and accurate transcript of 
proceedings does not exist. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 (1987) 
provides that 
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in 
longhand or typewritten, certified by him as being 
a correct transcript of evidence and proceedings, 
is prima facie a correct statement of such evidence 
and proceedings! ] 
However, in the present case, the reporter who transcribed the notes 
did not certify them as being a correct transcript of the evidence 
and proceedings, stating instead: 
I have, at the request of the Attorney General's 
office, transcribed the notes of a substitute 
reporter, TAUNI BYRD LEE, for the date of April 25, 
1988, which consists of pages 2 through 56, 
- 39 -
inclusive. To the best of my ability, the notes 
have been accurately transcribed. 
(T.M. 57) A comparison with her certification of the other portions 
of the transcript reveals a significant difference as to her 
"certification" of the accuracy of the transcript in dispute. 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 220, and one of the official court reporters of 
the State of Utah; that on the 20th of April, 1988, 
I attended the within matter and reported in 
shorthand the proceedings had thereat; that later I 
caused my said shorthand proceedings to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing 
pages, numbered from 2 to 50, inclusive, constitute 
a full, true and correct account of the Jury 
Selection/Voir Dire, to the best of my ability. 
(J.T. 51) Hence, there is no prima facie evidence in this case that 
the transcript is an accurate reflection of the proceedings. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the transcript itself that "illegible" 
portions are missing and, at the very least, the proceedings are 
incorrectly dated.9 
The trial judge's attempt to fill in the illegible 
portions and his ultimate order do not give this transcript any 
greater accuracy. The trial occurred one year and four months prior 
to the hearing on the Motion to Amend and Correct the Record. As 
trial counsel noted in his affidavit, remembering details regarding 
a specific case more than thirty days later is extremely difficult; 
along the same lines, reconstructing specific words in illegible 
portions is nearly impossible. In Felton v. State, 523 So.2d 775 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the Court pointed out: 
9 The proceedings at issue occurred on April 25, 1988, not 
April 25, 1989 as labeled by the reporter. 
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Reconstructions of an entire trial are relatively 
rare due to the extreme difficulties in preparing 
same; people's memories of a complex trial 
involving many witnesses are rarely such that a 
proper record can ever be reconstructed given the 
passage of time, 
Idk at 776. See also Felton v. State, 534 So.2d 911 (Pla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988) (reversing conviction after efforts at reconstruction 
proved unsuccessful). 
In Simmons v. State, 200 So.2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1967), the Court also focused on the difficulty of reconstructing a 
record after the passage of time. 
. . . the greater length of time which has now 
elapsed since the date of trial would have such a 
dulling effect upon the ability of the trial judge 
and trial counsel to recall with reasonable 
certainty all of the pertinent facts which were 
developed during the trial of this case as to 
render a reconstruction of the trial in narrative 
form unsatisfactory as a basis for fairly judging 
the merits of this appeal. 
Id. at 621. In Simmons, eighteen months elapsed from the date of 
the trial to the court's decision. 
In footnote 3 in Hardy, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized the difficulty of reconstructing a record: 
Recollections and notes of trial counsel and of 
others are apt to be faulty and incomplete. 
Hardy, 375 U.S. at 280. The trial judge's attempt to fill in the 
blanks in the transcript based on his memory sixteen months later 
does not adequately protect Mr. Jonas' right to appeal. 
Furthermore, the fact that appellate counsel did not 
represent Mr. Jonas at trial further prejudices Mr. Jonas since at 
the hearing in which the judge attempted to fill in the blanks, 
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appellate counsel was unable to give input to the judge as to the 
details of what occurred on April 25, 1988. 
In United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1977), 
the Fifth Circuit pointed out that two rules have evolved in cases 
involving the failure to comply with the Federal Court Reporter 
Act. Under the first rule, the defendant "must show that failure to 
record and preserve the specific portion of the trial proceedings 
visits a hardship upon him and prejudices his appeal." 559 F.2d at 
1305 (citations omitted). The second rule is applicable in cases 
involving new counsel on appeal and requires reversal where a 
substantial and significant portion of the record is missing, 
without showing specific prejudice to the defendant or error. 559 
F.2d at 1306. Given the greater protections to an appellant under 
the Utah Constitution, such a rule, where appellate counsel did not 
represent Defendant at trial, should apply. See also Hardy v. 
United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964) (acknowledging hardships 
faced by appellate counsel who did not represent a defendant at 
trial) . 
In the present case, although the missing day of the 
proceedings was transcribed by a reporter who was not present, such 
reporter was working from another reporterfs notes and unable to 
make out numerous portions. She was also unable to certify the 
proceedings as reflecting what had occurred in court. 
If this Court were to adopt the second rule in Selva, 
Mr. Jonas' convictions must be reversed since a significant portion 
of the proceedings, involving the details of a motion for mistrial 
- 42 -
after a bailiff improperly communicated with jurors, is missing.1° 
This case is comparable to Taylor since portions of the record which 
reflect directly on the impartiality of the jurors are missing. 
Because Mr. Jonas remembers information of a highly prejudicial 
nature being conveyed to the jurorsf the illegible portions of the 
transcripts and questions regarding not only the accuracy of the 
notes of the reporter who was present but also the accuracy of the 
way in which the nonpresent reporter transcribed those notes leaves 
a significant question as to what actually occurred in this case. 
In deciding whether Mr. Jonas1 right to an impartial jury was 
violated, as argued in Point IV, supra, this Court almost certainly 
will look to the details of what transpired. Without an accurate 
transcript, this Court may not be able to fully analyze that issue. 
The conditions under which this transcript was prepared 
and the obvious missing portions make the accuracy of this 
transcript highly suspect. Mr. Jonas8 memory of what the bailiff 
told the jurors was that Mr. Davis would be biased against Mr. Jonas 
because both Mr. Jonas and the perpetrator of the video store 
robbery had extensive records. The illegible portions of pages 1 
through 5 of the transcript of April 25, 1988 leave questions as to 
what transpired and what was told the jurors; the trial judge's 
order settling the record does not dispel those questions. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Jonas1 right to 
10 Furthermore, trial counsel believed he may have made an 
additional motion for mistrial which is completely missing from the 
transcripts. 
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appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution along 
with his statutory rights to appeal and receive an accurate 
transcript of proceedings were violated, and the matter should be 
reversed for a new trial from which a complete and accurate 
transcript can be prepared. 
B. MR. JONAS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED. 
The fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution 
guarantees Mr. Jonas due process and a fair trial. Although the 
right to appeal is not specifically stated in the federal 
constitution, once the right to appeal is established by statute or 
state constitution, it is included in the concept of due process of 
laWo See Reyes v. Delgado, 81 P.R.R. 906, 910 (1960); citing 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 18, 19 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 
214, 215, 216 (1958) (per curiam); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 
206, 208, 210 (1951). Hence, where a defendant's statutory or state 
constitutional right to appeal is jeopardized, his federal due 
process rights are also jeopardized. 
In order to adequately pursue an appeal, appellate counsel 
requires a complete and accurate transcript of the proceedings. See 
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 (1964).n Where appellate 
11 Although Hardy was not decided on constitutional 
grounds, its determination that a complete and accurate transcript 
is necessary for appellate counsel to adequately represent a 
defendant is nevertheless applicable. 
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counsel is unable to review a complete and accurate transcript of 
proceedings, an appellant's federal due process rights are violated. 
In this case, where portions of the proceedings are not 
included, and where the accuracy of the transcript as a reflection 
of what occurred in court is uncertain, Mr. Jonas' federal due 
process rights were violated. 
C. MR. JONAS1 DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
RIGHTS UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
While recognizing that federal due process rights are not 
implicated by the failure to reinstate a criminal appeal after an 
escaped defendant has been returned to custody, the Utah Supreme 
Court has nevertheless suggested that state due process rights may 
be implicated in such a circumstance. See Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705. 
Hence, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that in the context of 
criminal appeals, the due process clause of the State constitution 
may well offer greater protection than the federal due process 
right. Ij3., fn. 1; see Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 544-5 
(1977) (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
The nonexistence of an adequate transcript which appellate 
counsel can review for error, both error challenged at trial and 
"plain error," especially where appellate counsel did not represent 
appellant at trial, so severely impedes the ability to appeal that a 
defendant's state due process rights are violated. 
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Furthermore, Mr. Jonas1 "equal protection" rights under 
the Utah Constitution were violated. Article I, Section 24 of the 
State constitution provides: "All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform application." 
Although federal construction of the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment may be persuasive in construing 
Article I, Section 24, 
[t]he different language of Article I, § 24, the 
different constitutional contexts of the two 
provisions, and different jurisprudential 
considerations may lead to a different result in 
applying equal protection principles under 
Article I, § 24 than might be reached under federal 
law. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). In Malan, the Court 
pointed out that 
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of 
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to 
all persons within a class. (Citations omitted.) 
Second, the statutory classifications and the 
different treatment given the classes must be based 
on differences that have a tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute. (Citations omitted.) 
JEd. 
In Tuttle, the Court noted that a defendant's "equal 
protection" rights under Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
constitution may be jeopardized where an escaped defendant's appeal 
is not reinstated upon return to custody. 713 P.2d at 705. In 
footnote 1, the Court stated: 
We recognize that a majority of the United States 
Supreme Court has found that such dismissals and 
refusals to reinstate do not deny federal rights to 
due process or equal protection. Estelle v. 
Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 
377 (1975). However, that result appears based on 
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the premise that legislatures can freely restrict 
appeal rights because "there is no federal 
constitutional right to state appellate review of 
state criminal convictions." .Id. at 536, 95 S.Ct. 
at 1175. The analytical approach presumably would 
be different under our state analogue to the equal 
protection clause, Article I, section 24, because 
the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution, 
unlike the federal Bill of Rights, does confer a 
right to appeal on a criminal defendant. Cf. 
Malan v. Lewis, Utah, 693 P.2d 661, 67-72 TT984) 
(reviewing analysis of state equal protection 
claims). 
Id. In Utah, a criminal defendant has both a statutory and 
constitutional right to appeal his conviction. In addition, he has 
a right to have counsel represent him on appeal and to receive a 
transcript of proceedings. 
In cases where an adequate transcript for appeal was not 
prepared, a criminal defendant is being treated differently than 
others "similarly situated" and the laws are not being applied 
uniformly. In the instant case, where appellate counsel was not 
present at trial and used a transcript with illegible portions which 
did not contain information Appellant believed was conveyed to the 
jury, the laws governing Mr. Jonas1 right to appeal were not 
uniformly applied, thus denying him "equal protection" under 
Article I, Section 24 as well as due process under Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Galen Jonas, requests that his convictions be 
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for dismissal or a 
new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this Z2^ day of September, 1989. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate to ask this 
question, but I'm obligated to. Have any of you been the 
victims of a theft? And that, as I've indicated to you 
before what a theft really is, taking property of another witlji 
intent to permanently deprive them, or in receiving. Well, 
we'll take that first. I saw some hands go up in the jury 
box c 
All right. Mrs. Smith? I assume all you women are 
married unless you tell me otherwise. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my husband had about 
$13,000 worth of tools stolen about a year and a half ago 
which we have never --
THE COURT: Did a criminal act result from that --
or action? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was reported to 
the police, which they didn't do anything about, and we 
still have never gotten --
THE COURT: They didn't find it? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D, SMITH: (shook head from side to 
side) 
THE COURT: How long ago was that? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: About a year and a half 
ago. 
THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind, as I 
indicated, there are different parties involved, but sometimed 
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based on our experience we allow that to interfere with 
our thinking. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITHs It might be* If it was 
tools, I might be a little influenced. 
THE COURT: Well, wait just a minute. Let me ask the 
questions and you just answer the question. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: All right. 
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, do you believe that 
that incident would make it difficult for you to be fair and 
impartial, particularly to this Defendant, as v/ell as the 
people of the state of Utah? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It's a little hard to say, 
THE COURT: Well, you just take time to think it over 
because we -- you're the one that --
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It probably would, yes. 
THE COURT: Let's see. You're Mrs. --
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith. 
THE COURT: You don't believe that you could set 
those facts aside and make a determination on the evidence 
that's presented in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I -- well, yes, I believe 
I could be impartial. 
THE COURT: We know you didn't like to lose the tools. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, I didn't. 
THE COURT: All right, and Mrs. Searles? 
23 
ADDENDUM B 
F?L£lllB3',RKfi750«IR7 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 1 3 1989 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO AMEND AND CORRECT 
RECORD 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
GALEN L. JONAS, : Case No. CR86-1609 
Defendant/Appellant. : HONORABLE JAY BANKS 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L. JONAS, by and 
through counsel, JOAN C. WATT, and moves the Court pursuant to Rule 
11(g) and (h) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals to amend or 
correct the record to include the information contained in the four 
attached affidavits as part of the record in the above-captioned 
case. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the substitute 
Court Reporter who was present during the proceedings did not 
prepare a transcript of the proceedings held on April 25, 1988. 
According to the Court's minute entry at R. 162, the proceedings 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
held on April 25, 1988 included Defendant's motion for directed 
verdict, at least one motion for mistrial, and closing arguments of 
counsel* 
Appellate counsel has made repeated efforts to locate the 
Court Reporter without success. At the request of the Attorney 
General's office, a reporter who was not present during the 
proceedings obtained the notes of the substitute reporter and 
attempted to transcribe such notes0 However, relevant portions of 
the notes were "illegible*8 and therefore not transcribed. A copy of 
the transcript prepared by the Court Reporter who was not present 
during the proceedings is attached hereto0 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L« 
JONAS, respectfully requests that the record in the above-captioned 
case be corrected to include the information contained in the 
attached affidavitse 
DATED this *? day of June, 1989. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
- 2 -
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this / x ^ d a y of June, 1989. 
T 
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ADDENDUM C 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
Vo : 
GALEN L. JONAS, : Case No. CR86-1609 
Defendant/Appellant. : HONORABLE JAY BANKS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EDWARD BARTON, being first duly sworn upon oath, do 
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of 
my knowledge and belief: 
1. I am an Investigator for Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association. 
2. I have made the following attempts to locate Ms. Tauni 
Lee, former Court Reporter for the Third Judicial District Court: 
(a) I ascertained that Ms. Lee's husband had been 
arrested in October, 1987 and released through a bondsman. 
The address on the booking sheet and the bond are 
identical. The reporter is not currently residing at that 
address and appears to have resided at at least two other 
addresses since then. 
(b) I spoke with the person who took the reporter's 
husband out of jail. That person was exonerated from the 
bond when Mr. Lee was sentenced; he has not seen Mr. Lee 
since then. 
(c) I appeared in the Third Judicial District Court 
when Mr. Lee was scheduled to appear on an Order to Show 
Cause. The husband failed to appear and a bench warrant 
was issued. 
(d) I talked with the other Court Reporters and 
friends but have been unable to locate Ms. Lee. 
DATED this / day of June, 1989. 
EDWARD^BARTON 
Investigator 
- 2 -
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ( day of June, 
1989. 
mthki PUBLKT ? 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this day of June, 1989. 
- 3 -
ADDENDUM D 
JOAN C. WATT, #39 67 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
GALEN L. JONAS, : Case No. CR86-1609 
Defendant/Appellant. : HONORABLE JAY BANKS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)sst 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KAY L. LAMOREAUX, being first duly sworn upon oath, do 
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of 
my knowledge and belief: 
1. I am the Appellate Secretary for Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. 
2. During the past several months, I have made repeated 
attempts to locate Ms. Tauni Lee, former Court Reporter. Our office 
has cases in addition to the above-captioned case in which we have 
had difficulty obtaining transcripts. My attempts have included but 
have not been limited to the following? 
(a) On November 1, 1988, I telephoned Ms* Lee's 
last known phone number. It had been disconnected. 
(b) On November 2, 1988, I spoke with Ron Gibson of 
the Court Administration office. He had spoken with 
Ms. Lee that day and referred me to the Employment Security 
office. That office agreed to write Ms. Lee a note telling 
her to contact us. 
(c) On November 2, 1988, I also spoke with Susan 
Clawson, Personnel Director of Court Administration, who 
gave me the same disconnected phone number that I had 
called on November 1, 1988. 
(d) Ms. Lee called our office on November 4, 1988 
and gave me a neighbor's phone number. She indicated we 
could reach her through that number. She said she would 
check court records for information regarding missing 
transcripts and would call back within the week. 
(e) When I did not hear from Ms. Lee, I called the 
neighbor's number several times on November 8, 9 and 14, 
1988. I finally made contact on November 14, 1988, and the 
neighbor told me Ms. Lee had moved. 
- 2 -
(f) Since November 14, 1988, I have contacted the 
Court Administration office several times as well as the 
Employment Security office. Ms. Lee's whereabouts are 
unknown. 
(g) On January 12, 1989, I contacted Ron Gibson of 
Court Administration. He indicated that Ms. Lee had 
"dropped out of sight " Mr. Gibson commented that the 
Supreme Court is also pursuing preparation of transcripts 
by Ms. Lee. He told me that he would call if he located 
her. 
(h) On April 11, 1989, Ron Gibson indicated that 
the previous Friday he had informed Ed Barton of our office 
of Ms. Lee's most recent address. She is apparently living 
with her parents in California. I attempted to call her at 
(707) 544-1120; the number had been disconnected. I sent a 
letter to 1578 Peterson Lane, Centerville, California 93657 
by certified mail (return receipt requested), requesting 
that Ms. Lee prepare the missing portion of the Jonas 
transcript and contact us regarding other needed 
transcripts. The letter was returned by the postal 
department marked "no such address." 
- 3 -
DATED t h i s \gJt <3ay of June, 1989 
UROL* LAMOREAUX KJ 
Appellate Secretary 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /&r day of June, 
1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC''' f 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this day of June, 1939. 
ADDENDUM E 
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580 
YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v . : 
Case No. CR86-1609 
GALEN L. JONAS, : 
D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t • : Judge Jay Banks 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)sss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
1. Ronald J. Yengich, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
do hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the 
best of my knowledge and belief: 
L I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utahe 
2. I represented Defendant/Appellant, Galen L. Jonas, 
at trial in the Third Judicial District Court in the case of 
State v. Jonas, Case No. 880411-CA, currently on appeal in the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
3. In my 14 years of practice, I have always found it 
impossible to reconstruct a file or specific details of a case 
after approximately 30 days. I rely on the transcript of 
hearings and the court file for appellate purposes and for any 
other details I need to know. The transcript is the best means I 
Affidavit 
State v. Jonas, Case No. CR86-1609 
Page 2 
am aware of to record specific details and words without relying 
on generalities common to all trials,, 
4. I remember making a motion for mistrial in the 
above case based on some problem with a juror, I do not remember 
the specifics of that motion or the specific information conveyed 
to the jury. However, I recall generally that my major concern 
was the means and manner in which the information was conveyed, 
as well as what I conceived of as the prejudicial content. 
5. I also vaguely recall making a motion for mistrial 
based on the prosecutor's closing argument. I do not remember 
the details of that motion, but I believe it was made after 
objection and outside the presence of the jury. 
6. I have reviewed the file and attempted to 
reconstruct the events of that trial, given the number of trials 
I have had since that time. 
7. I have reviewed the transcript of proceedings which 
were held on April 25, 1988, and which was prepared by a reporter 
who was not present. Significant portions of what transpired, in 
particular, the specific details as to the information conveyed 
by the bailiff to the jurors, appear to be missing from that 
transcript. 
DATED this Q day of June^ , 1989• 
£1 
RONALD J. YENGI 
Attorney at Law 
Affidavit 
State v. Jonas, Case No. CR86-1609 
Page 3 
• N 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this C " day of 
June, 1989. I
 f r J 
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
^ / mi 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Third Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111; and a copy to the Office of the Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 
day of June, 1989. 
ADDENDUM F 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v, : 
GALEN L. JONAS, : Case No. CR86-1609 
Defendant/Appellant. : HONORABLE JAY BANKS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, GALEN L. JONAS, being first duly sworn upon oath, do 
hereby state the following facts are true and correct to the best of 
my knowledge and belief: 
1. I am the Defendant/Appellant in the case of State v. 
Jonas, Case No. 880411-CA, in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2. The trial in such case was held on April 19-25, 1988. 
3. On the afternoon of Friday, April 22, 1988, both sides 
rested. The court instructed the jurors and parties to return the 
following Monday, April 25, 1988, for instructions and closing 
arguments. 
4. On Monday, April 25, 1988, prior to the start of the 
proceedings, Juror Number 7, John Davis, informed the bailiff that 
he would be unable to proceed as a juror in the case and would have 
to disqualify himself for prejudice. He told the bailiff that his 
sister, Anna Holmes, had been killed over the weekend in an 
aggravated robbery of a video store. The case, along with the 
perpetrator's history of past crimes, had been highly publicized 
over the weekend. The juror told the bailiff that, as a result of 
my criminal past and his reactions to the death of his sister and 
the criminal past of the perpetrator in that case, he could not be 
fair. 
5. Mr. Davis was excused from the jury. The bailiff 
informed the remaining jurors as to the basis for excusing 
Mr. Davis, including the fact that Mr. Davis was the brother of the 
pregnant woman who had been shot in the video store over the weekend 
and felt that he could not be fair. 
6. The judge asked the bailiff why he conveyed the 
information to the jurors. The bailiff responded that he did so 
because Mr. Davis asked him to let the jurors know why he was 
excused. The judge asked whether the jurors were already aware of 
• 2 -
the information, and the bailiff responded that they were note 
7. A court reporter was present during the in-chambers 
hearing during which defense counsel made a motion for mistrial as a 
result of the jury being informed of the basis for excusing 
Mr. Davis. 
8. I have reviewed the transcript of proceedings held on 
April 25, 1988 which was prepared by a reporter who was not present 
and which contains numerous illegible portions. Significant 
portions of the record are missing from that transcript, including 
the information set forth above as to the specifics of what the 
bailiff told the jurors. 
DATED this °f day of June, 1989. 
/vyOst xjf^AQwb GALEN^rr.ATONAS 
Defendant/Appellant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this °f day of June, 
1989c 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^ 
Residing in/salt^Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: \j 
foC<^(W 
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, otah 84111 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Otah 84114 this day of June, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM G 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
FILES SJST&STSOyST 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 1 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GALEN L. JONAS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER SETTLING AND APPROVING 
RECORD 
Case No. CR86-1609 
Court of Appeals 880411-CA 
HONORABLE JAY E. BANKS 
Based upon Defendant's Motion to Amend and Correct Record 
and pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the record be settled and 
approved as follows: 
1. The information regarding the dismissal of Mr. Davis as 
a juror which the bailiff conveyed to the remaining jurors was that 
Mr, Davis1 sister had been killed in a robbery of a video store over 
the weekend and the trauma of that event made it impossible for 
Mr. Davis to continue serving on the jury because he could not 
concentrate. The "illegible" portion of page 2 of the transcript of 
the April 25, 1988 hearing contained a statement to the effect that 
the death of Mr. Davis1 sister in the robbery was so traumatic that 
Mr. Davis could not continue as a juror because he could not devote 
his attention to being a juror* 
2. The testimony by the bailiff, Hugh Bell, contained on 
page 5 of the transcript of the April 25, 1988 hearing that the 
jurors were not discussing the matter when he entered and did not 
know a thing about the death of Mr. Davis' sister before the bailiff 
told them is accurate. The statement on page 3 by Mr. Verhoef which 
contains the first "illegible11 portion on that page is incorrect 
since Deputy Bell testified that the jurors were unaware of the 
information. 
3. Defense counsel made a motion for mistrial based on the 
bailiff's communication with the jurors. The substance of defense 
counsel's objection is contained in the transcript. 
4. The Court does not recall an objection or motion being 
made by defense counsel during the prosecutor's closing argument or 
after the jurors began deliberating. 
DATED this / **~ day of J^ rf^ r, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE JAY E. BANKS 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
I have read the foregoing Order, and it accurately reflects 
the statements made by the trial judge during the hearing held on 
July 6, 1989. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1989. 
<jfc>-C.d£tt 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant 
/^ANDRA L. 
// Assistant^At^oiMey General 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 
the Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, this 7' day of July, 1989. 
. ^ / JELIVEREu 
/ AUG 1 1989 
0 D. LOYOLA 
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Apr i l 25, 1988 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Record should show this proceeding taking 
place out of the presence of the jury. The Defendant is 
present with counsel and the state's representative. 
You may proceed. 
MR. YENGICH: I would move admission of Defense 
Exhibits 27, 28, 29, which I forgot to move prior to the 
closing of my case. 
THE COURT: So ordered. Be sure and tell it to Joan. 
MR. YENGICH: Second thing is this morning, I think 
the record ought to reflect that juror number six, I believe 
Mr. Davis is his name, came in to chambers. 
THE COURT: Before any other jurors --
MR. YENGICH: Outside of the presence of the jury. 
Just -- only people present were counsel and the Court and 
indicated that his sister was the lady that was brutally 
shot in the head and killed at a convenience store or at a 
video store robbery over the weekend. The facts are that 
she was shot and she was eight months pregnant at the time 
and the baby was born. He indicated that he did not feel, 
under those circumstances, that he (illegible) 
We stipulated that he would be excused from jury servic^ 
I was told while we were going over jury instructions 
that the Bailiff in this case had mentioned to the other 
1 jurors that remained the reason for his being excused, i.e., 
2 that it was his sister that was the one that was killed. 
3 I THE COURT: The jurorfs sister. 
4 MR. VERHOEF: I think, in fairness to Mr. Bell, that 
g J Mr. Bell indicated that the jurors were discussing it, 
6 I apparently had (illegible) at least one of the jurors had 
7 knowledge that that was the fact. 
8 MR. YENGICH: Well, anyway, he did inform them of that 
9 J and that oay (illegible) how the Court is going to rule, we 
may have to have a hearing on it, but my motion at this time 
is, under those circumstances, for mistrial. 
THE COURT: Well, I did call Mr. Bell in and he said 
that he had told the jurors -- what was the juror's name? 
14 | MR. VERHOEF: Davis. 
16 | THE COURT: Mr. Davis had been excused because of that 
16 I reason, and you are making a motion for --
17 MR. YENGICH: Mistrial 
18 THE COURT: I"11 deny it without prejudice. 
19 J MR, YENGICH: Thanks, Judge. 
THE COURT: Have you made a motion for directed 
21 I verdict? 
22 I MR. YENGICH: I have made my motion for directed 
verdict. I will renew it. My motion for directed verdict 
24 I is on the basis not only that I briefly argued, but that the 
25 evidence shows that the Defendant knew the property was not 
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stolen an d that 
applies as we!ve 
merit 
THE 
MR. 
of 
COURT: 
the mistake 
argued in 
of 
the 
fact 
jury 
or mistake of law 
instructions. 
That motion is denied. 
YENGICH: Also on 
law. 
the basis of entrapment as 
issue 
a 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: That motion is denied. 
YENGICH: Thank you, Judge. 
Instructions bring them let them eat lunch. 
THE 
right on, 
ve'll --
COURT: Depending on how long you take, might go 
let him make his (illegible) without a break 
(Whereupon, Judge Banks placed Bailiff HUGH BELL 
under oath, who testified as follows:) 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
COURT: State your name. 
WITNESS: Hugh Bell. 
COURT: And you are Deputy Sheriff? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
COURT: Bailiff of this court? 
WITNESS: Yes. 
COURT: This morning at nine o'clock Mr. Davis 
came in and stated reasons to the Court why he would like 
to be excused from the case, and would you tell us the 
sequence of events that happened after he left the chambers? 
THE WITNESS: He came into the courtroom and asked 
for statement of service on his jury duty and I went to Joan, 
I 4 J 
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found where the statement was, got her to f i l l one out for 
him, gave to him. I walked to t h e door and expressed my 
sympathy to him and e v e r y t h i n g , and he asked me i f I would 
t e l l the r e s t of t h e j u r o r s what happened, why he was 
excused. 
THE COURT: And what did you do? 
THE WITNESS: I went in and I t o l d them t h a t Mr. Davis 
wou ldn ' t be i n because h i s s i s t e r was the lady t h a t was 
sho t out in West Va l l ey . 
THE COURT: Were they d i s c u s s i n g the case or the 
i n c i d e n t a t a l l when you went in? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Did you ever hear them discuss it? 
THE WITNESS: They didn't know a thing about it. 
THE COURT: All right, you may cross-examine. 
MR. YENGICH: No cross-examination. 
(Illegible) thing that what was said by the Bailiff in 
his defense was intended to have affected the outcome of the 
trial I know, you know to be (illegible) I want that on the 
record, notwithstanding that I would renew my motion which 
the Court, which has been denied. Renew it on the basis of 
the record. 
MR. VERHOEF: No cross-examination. 
THE COURT: The record nay show that all jurors, 
except Mr. Davis, are present. The Defendant is present with 
j counsel, and state is represented, 
2 Mr. Davis, number seven juror, has been excused 
3 because of personal problems this morning, and so, Mr. 
4 Naughton, you move into Mr. Davis gs seat, and Mr. Smith in 
§ number eight. 
6 MR. YENGICH: So stipulated, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Naughton, you were an alternate before. 
8 iicvi you are a full member of the jury and will go in and 
9 J participate in the deliberations with the jury. 
JUROR NAUGHTON: I understand, sir. 
THE COURT: There is another matter. We're late 
getting started. These instructions took a lot longer, not 
as was anticipated. We can go through and instruct you and 
have the case argued to you. It will throw your lunch 
late, but if it is agreeable with you, we'll have lunch 
16 I sent into the jury room with you after you retire, and is 
17 that agreeable to all members of the jury? Sometimes jurors 
8^ I have to eat at certain times. Is that agreeable? 
That is the way we'll handle it. It will throw lunch 
as late as an hour or so, but I think we'll save time in 
the long run. 
22 I (Whereupon, Judge Banks read the jury instructions, 
23 which were not reportea or transcribed.) 
24 THE COURT: I might mention here some of these 
25 instructions refer to singular but apply it as it actually 
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ADDENDUM I 
$ 
ft 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
Nc-onan 
»>* Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Galen Le Jonas, 
Defendant and Appellant• 
ORDER 
Court of Appeals No* 880411-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion 
For Extension Of Time For Preparation Of Appellant's Brief, 
filed 31 January 1989. 
It is hereby ORDERED that appellant is given an 
extension of time up to and including 10 days from the date of 
this Order to locate the court reporter and so notify, in 
writing, the Court. If appellant is unsuccessful in locating 
the reporter, appellant is given an additional 20 days to 
reconstruct the record and submit the same, pursuant to Rule 11 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this £& day of February 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Russell W. Bench 
ADDENDUM J 
F I L 
IN THF UTAH COUNT i)V APPEALS FEB 2iW989 
- - — 0 0 O 0 0 -
Waft-Court or Appeals 
f Utah, 
ORDER 
Plaintiiri and Respondent 
Court: of Appeals No 880411-CA 
Defendant and Appellant. 
This matter is before the Coin: t upon appel lant' s 
Request For Extension Of Time In Which fo Locate Cc^rt 
Reporter, filed 13 Februar y 1989. It is hereby ORDERED 
that appellant is granted an addition*! 30 days K* ; 
and Including 25 March 1989
 # in which to locate ft 
reporter, and so notify, in writing, the Court 
further extensions to locate the court reporfe* 
be gran,ted, 
in trie e w *t > n- ->^*^» , . ^ iit • - . ,<:>** **- *., , - .-»t ^  . )c 
repoi ter# : r , ^uthei ORDERED that appellant, is c ven 
an additions. ^0 days, up to and including 14 April 
1989, to reconstruct the record and submit the same, 
pi irsi lant *'• ' ^ H P M ^f' * K^ ?lf v** ~-^-r* ** *>--r^ **-
Dated this J 2 ? ^ d a y I h-lir *i i y 1«"I89. 
Judge Russell W. Bench 
ADDENDUM K 
JOAN C. «~*;', 13967 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF I I'l "UI 
THK fl'TATF; 'Op" l!T : MOTION TO AMEND RECORD 
Plaintiff/Respondent • : 
v, : 
GALEN L, J'ONAS, • a**-- No. CHb6-i6P9 
Defendant/Appellant. >N JRABLE JAY B A N ^ 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant* GALEN t -^ ^ *nd 
t h r o u q h c o u n s e t
 l( . 10 h H i , w i T1 •,, 
I I I q ) ot t h e R u J e s of t h e U t a h u » u f c» a p p e a l s r- i n c l u d e trse tour 
attached affidavits as part of the recoid j.n the above-captioned 
case, 
• This motion *- -s-V v the grounds t-hat the Court Reporter 
die m t prepare a t: » ^ n«? ^  r * -1 *"v*e "*» r -e^Airt-:^ h^'"' 
• I '" 
proceedings 'it-.-, un April .-> <* — • ^claded Defendant ' s motion for 
d i r e c t e d — i- • -r i.eaSu one motion for - • -sirig 
: ; •• - uunse i . 
Appellate counsel has made repeated efforts to locate the 
Court Reporter without success. The Court of Appeals has ordered 
that counsel attempt to amend the record no later than April 14, 
1989e 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant, GALEN L. 
JONAS, respectfully requests that the attached affidavits be 
included in the record in the above-captioned case. 
DATED this /*/ day of April, 1989. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this /</ day of April, 1989. 
ADDENDUM 
) !: V 
THK ATTORNEY GKXI vR A i. 
S T A I V (>l I "I \ l l 
H } > M ! \ A \ i • \ M 
A"> TOW(Mf v OiE ssf HAL. 
I A H ! r l>oHH"S. ( n i l r 
I.INDA l .UNSTKA. ( ' m i l 
I 'M l> C. \ K I . S o Y I ' I I I I T 
A p r i l 20f "189 
DAVID \ . THOMAS 
ASSOCIATE SE=> J T * ATTQasEv G£'.E = i . 
STKIMIK\ (.. SCI fW'KMJlMAY < H IKK 
Ta* & Business =*eg„.at.o- S . s s~ 
STKI 'HKN -J. S O W - : \ S O V C 'HIK I • 
MIC HAL! . !J SMITH, ( ' H I M 
Anna Bennett, C.S.R. 
Third Judicial District Court 
230 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1 
State \ Galen S. Jonas, Di st. Ct. No. CR 86-1609 
Ct. of App. No. 880411-Ca 
Dear .Ms Ben nett i 
As I advised you by telephone on April 19, 1989, the 
State requests you to prepare, from Tauni Lee's notes, 
transcripts of the hearings at which she served as court reporter 
in this case. Upon completion of the transcripts, please certify 
them and transmit them to the District Court Clerk so that they 
may be certified as part of the appellate record, 
Please bill this nlJue lm pieparation of the 
transcripts. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
SANDRA JOGREN 
As sistant Attorney Genera ] 
Criminal Appeals Section Chief 
SLSsbks 
ccs Joan Watt 
ADDENDUM M 
F l l 
PC-
C.'t-r G f . ^ Court 
Utan Court o; Appeals 
IIIMI trtHh ICJiJKT UF APPEALS DP THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, • NOTICE THAT TRANSCRIPT IS 
NOT ADEQUATE FOR APPELLATE 
Plaintiff/Respondent! REVIEW 
GALEN J ?NA<2.. "as^ No. 380411-CA 
Defendant 'iDpellar.t : 
Pursuant- - : .--•--.- * A D O ^ a l s d i \- i m n i >l , 
19 89, *.• •- : -' * s :;.-k- •  i. -, i a r*o •. , r wu9r* - vu.'iiti ^  
JOAt< '. W J *. hereby notifies -r.f-- Court that the transcr;c* p-^pa^ed 
by ANN- v BENNETT from h,-. • *-•-. ,t • 1 
LKK fci . , 1 ' ^ v,, ,vt , . . u;vd, •. rie lci^L Jay tria. ; 1 m e 
above-capt loned r a s e , is not adequate f >r purposes *~ -appeuju. 
As r - ;-. 
ut:iendant/Appellant shall attempt to reconstruct tne rec r- pursuant 
-• /ule :., Rules oi the Utah Court of Appeals (19o/; u , 
1989 « 
DATED this / day of June, '989. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Dtah 34114 this ^^ day 
of June, 1989. 
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